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ABSTRACT
In light of the recent Supreme Court decision Young v. UPS,
pregnancy accommodation in the workplace is once again at the
forefront of employment law. Pregnancy is not considered a disability
under the ADA, nor is it within the scope of Title VII protections,
but states are passing their own pregnancy accommodation laws.
These laws will affect employers and employees alike, but exactly
how is uncertain. Perhaps the most natural (and obvious) result of
the explosion of state pregnancy accommodation laws will be a fed-
eral law, or an amendment to the ADA categorizing pregnancy as a
disability. But there are reasons that the seemingly minimal accom-
modations for pregnant workers have not been met with overwhelm-
ing support. Some fear the increased cost to employers. Others fear
the stigma of equating pregnancy with a disability.
Nevertheless, employers will have to grapple with increased
state protections supplementing the already-existing scheme of Title
VII. Young adds another complication by lessening the burden to
prove an employer’s duty to accommodate. For multinational corpo-
rations, tailoring their pregnancy policies to each state might prove
costlier than uniformly implementing the plan of the most generous
state. Employers are already accommodating disabled employees in
the same manner. And these accommodations are by definition “rea-
sonable.” Employers might not only avoid needless liability by pro-
viding accommodations to pregnant workers—even when not
required—but might also gain numerous benefits, such as: increased
morale; lower attrition rates; more productive workers; and better
reputations. Accommodating pregnant workers seems uncontrover-
sial, but every federal bill introduced to do so has been strongly op-
posed and stopped. States may now be leading the way and,
ultimately, pregnancy accommodation laws will create positive bene-
fits for women.
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012, The University of
Scranton
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the presence of pregnant women and women of childbearing
age in the workforce, pregnancy discrimination was not a recognized form
of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act until the
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978.1 Thirty-six
years later, the Supreme Court is still grappling with the proper scope of the
PDA; it recently decided Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,2 concerning how
the PDA’s prohibition on discrimination applies to employers’ accommoda-
tion plans.3 The PDA defines pregnancy discrimination and requires em-
ployers to treat pregnant workers, for all employment-related purposes, the
same as non-pregnant workers who are similar in their “ability or inability”
to work.4 Unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the PDA does
not require employers to provide accommodations to pregnant workers.5
However, the Court in Young had to decide the extent to which this general
non-duty to accommodate changes when the employer provides accommo-
dations for other employees.6 The analysis partly turned on whether the
non-pregnant employees receiving accommodations were similarly situated
to pregnant workers.7 In some instances this is an easy analysis. For exam-
ple, if an employer provides extra water breaks and light-duty assignments
for workers with non-job related back pain, then the employer would be
required to provide the same accommodation for pregnant women with
back pains. But Young was not such an easy case because it was unclear
whether the pregnant workers and the classes of non-pregnant workers be-
ing provided accommodations were similarly situated.8
In Young, the plaintiff, who had been an employee of UPS since 1999,
became pregnant and was medically restricted from lifting over 20 pounds;9
her job required her to lift packages weighing between 70 and 150
pounds.10 UPS informed her that she could not continue as a driver because
she was unable to perform the lifting requirement of her position.11 The
PDA does not necessarily require UPS to make an accommodation to
Young, but the company made accommodations to other employees in three
1. See infra Part I.A for a detailed history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
2. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
3. Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
5. Id.
6. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1342.
7. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1347.
8. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1348.
9. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
10. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
11. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
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different scenarios: (1) temporary light-duty transfers for employees injured
during the course of their job; (2) transfer of jobs for drivers who lost their
driver’s licenses (pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement); and (3)
employees who qualified as disabled under the ADA.12
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no
duty to accommodate, despite the accommodations provided to other em-
ployees.13 The court found that the other accommodated employees were
not appropriate comparators and therefore not similarly situated.14 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to settle possible interpretations of the PDA
regarding who is a proper comparator.15 UPS argued that the PDA’s sole
purpose is to define pregnancy as a form of sex discrimination and not to
give special status to pregnant women by requiring accommodations.16
Young, conversely, argued that the PDA requires “an employer to provide
the same accommodations to workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy
that it provides to workplace disabilities that have other causes but have a
similar effect on the ability to work.”17
The Court rejected both interpretations18 and, instead, adopted an
intermediate approach.19 It examined the EEOC guidelines, which specifi-
cally addressed the Young-type situation.20 The guidelines provided an ex-
12. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
13. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 451 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 1338 (2015).
14. Young, 707 F.3d at 450.
15. Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
16. Brief for Respondent at 25, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338
(2015) (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 5512140.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015)
(No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4441528.
18. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349 (“We cannot accept either of these interpretations.”).
19. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54.
20. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1351. In July 2014 the EEOC released guidelines stating that
employers should provide workplace accommodations. See infra note 35. The EEOC
also addressed the situation in which some employees receive lifting accommodations
but not pregnant employees. The guidelines stated:
An employer has a policy or practice of providing light duty, subject to
availability, for any employee who cannot perform one or more job duties
for up to 90 days due to injury, illness, or a condition that would be a
disability under the ADA. An employee requests a light duty assignment for
a 20–pound lifting restriction related to her pregnancy. The employer de-
nies the light duty request.
2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 626–I(A)(5), p. 626:0013 (July 2014). The Court
did not adopt these guidelines because it had reservations about the timing, consis-
tency, and thoroughness of the consideration. It noted that the EEOC’s latest posi-
tion contradicted its long-standing interpretation that would not require such an
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ample of an employer having a policy to provide light-duty for temporarily
disabled employees but not providing the accommodations for pregnant
workers.21 The EEOC contended that would be a violation of the PDA
under a disparate treatment theory.22 However, the Court gave the guide-
lines only Skidmore deference,23 and found such a broad interpretation of
the PDA unpersuasive.24 Likewise, the Court rejected UPS’ theory because
it would fail to comport with Congress’s objective of treating pregnant
workers equal to similarly-situated employees.25 The Court held that a preg-
nant employee could establish a discrimination claim under the PDA by
making a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas (showing that she be-
longed to the protected class, she sought an accommodation, she was denied
the accommodation, and other similarly-situated employees were granted an
accommodation).26 Then, the employer can offer a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for denying her accommodation.27 Next, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to show that the proffered reason was pretext.28 Unlike ordi-
nary McDonnell Douglas burden shifting,29 the plaintiff can prove pretext,
accommodation. Furthermore, it questioned the basis of the EEOC’s latest
interpretation.
21. 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 626-I(A)(5), p. 626:0013 (July 2014).
22. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352.
23. There are two types of deference given to administrative interpretations. The first
type is Chevron deference, which applies a two-step analysis. Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Under Chevron, the
initial question is whether Congress has specifically addressed the issue at hand. If
Congress has addressed the interpretation or ambiguity, the court must give full
deference to congressional intent. On the other hand, if Congress has not addressed
the issue at hand, the court will ask whether the administrative agency’s interpreta-
tion is a reasonable construction of the statute. If so, the court will defer to the
agency when it is clear that Congress delegated authority to the administrative
agency to interpret the law and provide regulations. Express authorization of inter-
pretative power indicates that Chevron deference is proper. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43. Second, there is Skidmore deference, which provides that the “rulings, inter-
pretations and opinions of the Administrator . . . , while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
24. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352.
25. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353.
26. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
27. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
28. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
29. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Court recognized that an
employer could discriminate against an employee for mixed reasons (one of which
was discriminatory), and the discrimination did not have to be the sole motivating
factor (“but-for” causation). Thus, a mixed-motive jury instruction is a lower eviden-
tiary burden because a plaintiff must prove discrimination was a motivating factor
but not the sole factor. However, in order to get a mixed-motive jury instruction, the
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and thus submit the case to the jury, by showing “that the employer’s ‘legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the bur-
den, [and]—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to
an inference of intentional discrimination.”30
The Court effectively created a new burden-shifting scheme for cer-
tain PDA claims regarding accommodations. Now, a plaintiff can create a
jury issue by showing that the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason imposes a significant burden on her, and that such burden cannot be
justified, which in turn gives rise to an inference of discrimination.31 Ac-
cordingly, the judgment in Young was vacated and remanded to the Fourth
Circuit.32 This new standard may help plaintiffs in PDA claims by eliminat-
ing the need for direct evidence of discrimination in order to prove pretext
in a mixed-motive case. Moreover, the new standard takes into account the
burden imposed by the employer’s non-accommodation and requires the
employer to essentially justify it.
Although Young is a positive step and might provide great benefits to
pregnant workers whose employers provide accommodation to other work-
ers, its holding is limited. When companies do not provide accommoda-
tions to any of their workers, they are not obligated to provide any for
pregnant workers either. Consequently, pregnant workers will not be legally
entitled to workplace accommodations unless an employer provides extra
accommodation benefits to workers, and pregnant workers are similarly sit-
uated to such workers.
Suppose a blue-collar woman works as a bank teller, earning a near
minimum wage salary. She has limited means and no financial resources
other than her income from the bank. As part of her job, company policy
Court seemed to require direct evidence of discrimination. Absent direct discrimina-
tion, a defendant can avoid liability by proving it would have made the same deci-
sion anyway, regardless of the one potentially discriminatory reason. But, a plaintiff
that relied on a “but-for” causation theory (ordinary McDonnell Douglas) needed to
put forth only circumstantial evidence to overcome the employer’s proffered legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason and submit the case to the jury. Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). Thus, a distinction arose between mixed-motive
and but-for discrimination cases until the 1991 Title VII Amendments. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In Desert Palace, Inc., the
Court interpreted the 1991 Amendment and held that a plaintiff did not have to
show direct evidence in a mixed-motive case, and could use circumstantial evidence
instead. Id. After Desert Palace, a plaintiff, seeking a mixed-motive instruction, would
have to “present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
30. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354–55 (emphasis added).
31. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354–55.
32. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1356.
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requires that she stand at the bank counter (supposedly to appear more
professional to customers). While still working, she becomes pregnant and
develops related minor medical complications, such as swollen feet and high
blood pressure. To help with her condition, her doctor recommends sitting
on a stool, instead of standing at work. She requests an accommodation
from her employer, which is denied. The employer further tells her that if
she is unable to stand, she will lose her job just as any other employee would
(excluding qualified individuals under the ADA).
Under the PDA, the employer is not required to provide such an ac-
commodation, even though it appears minimally burdensome for the em-
ployer.33 The pregnant bank teller would have a valid Title VII claim in
only two situations: if the employer directly discriminated against her be-
cause of her pregnancy and not because of her inability to stand, or if the
employer was treating similarly-situated employees more favorably.34 In
other words, if the employer would fire an employee, who, for example,
broke his leg and could not stand, then the employer would be fully justi-
fied in firing the pregnant bank teller. This gap in the law has been costly
for pregnant women in the workplace.35 Despite the EEOC’s suggestion
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
35. See Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, EEOC, avail-
able at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm#dissta (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2015). In example 19, the EEOC states:
Pregnancy-Related Impairment Constitutes ADA Disability Because It Sub-
stantially Limits a Major Life Activity.
In Amy’s fifth month of pregnancy, she developed high blood pressure,
severe headaches, abdominal pain, nausea, and dizziness. Her doctor diag-
nosed her as having preeclampsia and ordered her to remain on bed rest
through the remainder of her pregnancy. This evidence indicates that Amy
had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, since she had a physiologi-
cal disorder that substantially limited her ability to perform major life activ-
ities such as standing, sitting, and walking, as well as major bodily functions
such as functions of the cardiovascular and circulatory systems. The effects
that bed rest may have had on alleviating the symptoms of Amy’s preec-
lampsia may not be considered, since the ADA Amendments Act requires
that the determination of whether someone has a disability be made with-
out regard to mitigating measures.
Id. See also Brigid Schulte, States Move to Ensure Pregnant Workers Get Fair Chance to
Stay on Job, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/09/08/states-move-where-
congress-wont-to-ensure-pregnant-workers-get-fair-shot-to-stay-on-job/ (“In recent
years, a rising number of lawsuits and discrimination claims filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission show that pregnant women have been fired
for requesting to carry a water bottle to stay hydrated, on their doctors’ orders. Many
who have asked for lighter duty, a break from heavy lifting or a desk job instead of
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that employers provide reasonable accommodations,36 courts have never in-
terpreted Title VII to require that.
Such a narrow reading of the PDA limits women’s participation in the
workforce and has particularly negative consequences for women of lesser
socio-economic status.37 Women who are not provided paid leave and are
financially unable to take unpaid leave (even if they are eligible) have no
choice but to continue working during their pregnancies. Thus, a preg-
nancy-accommodation provision is vital for women with lower-socio-eco-
nomic status to remain at their jobs.
Federal bills that would require an accommodation for pregnant work-
ers have repeatedly failed in Congress.38 But recently, states have been enact-
ing their own legislation requiring just that.39 In 2014, New Jersey enacted
the Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act, which amended the State’s discrimina-
tion law and added protections for pregnant women.40 The act requires em-
ployers to make affirmative accommodations for pregnant workers.41 Other
driving or going out on patrol as a police officer, have been terminated or forced to
use up all their paid and unpaid leave before giving birth.”).
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Brigid Schulte & Nia-Malika
Henderson, EEOC to Employers: Stop Discriminating Against Pregnant Workers,
WASH. POST (July 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-peo-
ple/wp/2014/07/15/eeoc-to-employers-stop-discriminating-against-pregnant-work-
ers/ (“This is an enduring problem in America’s workplaces—we’re not where we
need to be with regard to fair, equal treatment of pregnant workers. We’re just
not.”). See e.g., EEOC Releases Demanding New Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance,
JACKSON LEWIS (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/re-
sources.php?NewsID=4935 (noting that the suggested accommodations constituted
“controversial” guidance).
37. See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 444, 454 (2012) (“These ‘gaps in the law for pregnant
women’ . . . frequently affect women in low-income work, where rigid work rules
restrict workers’ ability to consume water, vary their working positions, and curtail
repetitive, physically demanding activities. In these industries, women able to fully
conform to employer expectations oriented around male norms during the rest of
their work lives predictably lose their jobs when they become pregnant.”).
38. See, e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1975, 113th Cong. § (2013);
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. § (2012).
39. See Amanda Haverstick, Proliferating State & Local Pregnancy Accommodation Laws
Make Modifying ADA/FMLA Procedures a Must for Most Employers, FORBES (June 17,
2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/06/17/pro-
liferating-state-local-pregnancy-accommodation-laws-make-modifying-adafmla-pro-
cedures-a-must-for-most-employers/; Schulte, supra note 35.
40. Lauren Khouri, He Signed It! New Jersey Expands Protection for Pregnant Workers,
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/he-
signed-it-new-jersey-expands-protection-pregnant-workers; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
12(s) (2014).
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(s) (2014).
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states have passed similar laws as well.42 The development of new laws
brings new questions: How far will employers have to go to provide accom-
modations for pregnant workers? What will be the implications for pregnant
workers’ long-term success in the workplace? Will the state law develop-
ments push Congress to pass the federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act?
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II of this Article provides the
history and background of federal protections for pregnant workers. It dis-
cusses the requirements of Title VII and the PDA, and available pregnancy
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. It also explains the accom-
modation requirements of the ADA, and speculates about what state preg-
nancy accommodation laws might require. Part III explores recently enacted
state accommodation laws, with a particular focus on the New Jersey Preg-
nant Worker’s Fairness Act. Part IV first examines the opposition to preg-
nancy accommodations and the potential economic costs to employers.
Then, it discusses how such feared costs are exaggerated and how pregnancy
accommodations could actually benefit businesses. Part V argues in favor of
states adopting accommodation laws to achieve a critical mass of states and,
ultimately, a federal law that uniformly protects pregnant workers. In par-
ticular, it focuses on how the rise in pregnancy accommodation laws might
change employers’ practices and guidelines. Finally, Part VI concludes in
favor of the continued adoption of state pregnancy accommodation laws.
I. HISTORY & BACKGROUND
Before the passage of Title VII, pregnant women did not have any job
protections in the workplace. Women generally did not have equal rights in,
and access to, the workplace, which allowed employers to exclude female
workers.43 Assumptions and stereotypes about women’s physical capabilities
42. See infra notes 131, 132 and accompanying text.
43. See Lise Vogel, Debating Difference: Feminism, Pregnancy, and the Workplace, 16 FEM-
INIST STUD. 9, 12 (1990) (arguing that sex-segregation in the market excluded
women from many jobs in the workplace). Vogel also explains that in the early twen-
tieth century many states had explicit laws forbidding pregnant women from the
workplace. Id. See also Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex:
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 72–73
(2013) (“Vestiges of this regime [protective legislation] lingered long into the twenti-
eth century, as a wide variety of state laws and employer policies restricted occupa-
tions, job duration, and benefits based on sex, pregnancy, childbirth, childrearing, or
a combination thereof, all designed to reinforce (white) women’s prescribed maternal
roles.”); Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Over-
coming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 15, 22 (2009) (“The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic change in
the regulation of pregnancy and work. Against a long history of exclu-
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severely limited their advancement.44 Given the perceived physical weakness
of women,45 pregnancy further restricted women’s employment opportuni-
ties.46 Women were excluded even from serving on juries, and working as
lawyers47 and bartenders, because of their childbearing capabilities.48 Prior
to World War II, positions that women were eligible to occupy in the
workforce were often limited and remedial.49 Cases prior to Title VII rou-
tinely cited women’s physical limitations as a justification for exclusion.50
Many of those laws, that purported to protect women’s maternal functions,
actually served to relegate women to lower positions and minimize their
ability to advance in the workplace;51 thus, protective legislation preserved
women’s roles in the personal sphere.52
sion . . . policies that survived challenge, a new legal regime emerged to protect
pregnant workers against discrimination beginning in the 1970s.”).
44. Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961,
963 (2013) (“These laws [employment policies] relied upon overbroad stereotypes
regarding women’s physical weakness and normative judgments regarding women’s
proper sphere . . . .”).
45. Id.
46. Id. (“Pregnancy, and motherhood more generally, was once a primary justification
for laws limiting all women’s employment rights.”). See also Katharine T. Bartlett,
Pregnancy and the Constitution: the Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1532
(1974) (“That women may and do become pregnant is the most significant single
factor used to justify the countless laws and practices that have disadvantaged women
for centuries.”). Additionally, once working women became pregnant, there was an
expectation that they would cease their employment to raise their children. See Cath-
erine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1112–24 (2009).
47. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1998); D. Kelly Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: Women and
Legal Education in the United States 1870–1890, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977).
48. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, DEBORAH L. RHODE & JOANNA L. GROSSMAN,
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 173 (6th ed. 2013)
(describing the biological differences of men and women as a justification for dis-
crimination based on sex).
49. See Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act on the Workplace—From A Legal and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L.
REV. 93, 98–99 (2005).
50. Id. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908) (“[W]oman’s physical
structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in
the struggle for subsistence . . . . This difference justifies a difference in legislation.”).
51. Brake & Grossman, supra note 43, at 72 (“But this ‘protection’ was often a pretext
for preserving better jobs for men and did not affect all women equally.”).
52. Vogel, supra note 43, at 12 (“Over time, special treatment for women through pro-
tective legislation not only reinforced sex segregation in the labor market, but it also
increasingly became the basis for policies and practices that harmed women workers.
In the name of protection, special—but often unfavorable—treatment of pregnant
workers thus became a norm that was still in place in the early 1970s.”). See Brake &
Grossman, supra note 43, at 72.
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The legal landscape changed in the 1960’s when Title VII was passed,
forbidding employers from discriminating against employees on account of
sex.53 The prohibition on sex discrimination seemingly encompassed preg-
nancy discrimination, considering that pregnancy is sex specific—but that
presumption was false.
A. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Even after the passage of Title VII, employers were free to discriminate
on the basis of pregnancy. Because discrimination on account of pregnancy
still was not considered discrimination on the basis of sex, employers con-
tinued to hire and promote non-pregnant women over pregnant women
and exclude pregnant women from company benefits.54 The first Supreme
Court case to address pregnancy discrimination, twelve years after the pas-
sage of Title VII, was General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.55 In Gilbert, female
employees brought a Title VII action alleging discrimination because the
company’s health plan excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy.56 The
plan provided 60% of normal earnings to employees with non-occupational
sickness or injury as a result of an accident.57 The Supreme Court held that
an employer did not violate Title VII by having its disability plan exclude
coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities.58 In a perplexing analysis, the
Court reasoned that women were not less protected than men under the
plan and stated, “the program divides potential recipients into two
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2007).
54. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 43, at 23 (“It remained common for employers in
the 1960s and 1970s to overtly impede pregnant women’s access to new or continued
employment, even as women were gaining statutory and constitutional protection
against sex discrimination . . . . [M]any employers continued to refuse to hire preg-
nant women, to require them to leave before a certain point in their pregnancies, to
exclude them from certain jobs, or to deny them fringe benefits like insurance, disa-
bility coverage, or leave.”) (emphasis added); Widiss, supra note 44, at 963 (“Until
the 1970s, however, public and private policies that provided health insurance, sick
days, and benefits for employees with illnesses or injuries routinely excluded “nor-
mal” pregnancies.”).
55. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court decided two cases prior to Gilbert concerning
pregnancy discrimination, but those were decided on due process grounds and not
under Title VII. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invali-
dating a public school policy that forced women to take unpaid maternity leave once
they reached the fourth month of their pregnancies); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (validating a California law that excluded pregnancy from the compre-
hensive list of disabilities covered under the state insurance policy). The reasoning in
Geduldig was later applied in Gilbert to conclude that pregnancy discrimination was
not a form of sex discrimination.
56. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127–28.
57. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128.
58. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46.
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groups—pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While the first group
is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”59 Thus,
the Court held that Title VII did not cover pregnancy discrimination be-
cause pregnancy discrimination was not “because of sex.”60 The Court rec-
ognized that while it is true that both men and women could be non-
pregnant, only women could become pregnant. Despite this, the Court de-
clared that pregnancy discrimination is not because of sex, because non-
pregnant persons can be men and women.
Congress responded to Gilbert in 1978 by passing the PDA, which
overruled the Court’s decision.61 The PDA amends Title VII and specifi-
cally categorizes pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.62
An employer cannot fire an employee simply because she is pregnant.63
However, it can terminate the employment of a pregnant employee if she is
unable to perform the core functions of the job description, and the em-
ployer would have treated a similarly-situated employee equally.64 For exam-
ple, suppose a plaintiff was fired because her morning sickness made her late
to work. The employer, stating that her pregnancy and encompassing tardi-
ness was unacceptable, fired her.65 In order to succeed on her claim, the
plaintiff would have to prove that the employer would not have fired a male
employee who, for example, had insomnia and was often late to work. This
can be difficult to prove absent concrete comparative examples.66 That pre-
cise issue is why many scholars argue that the PDA did not go far enough
and should include an accommodation provision; currently, it has no such
provision, despite the EEOC’s newly issued guidelines.67
59. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20
(1974)).
60. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140.
61. See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 43 (surveying recent case law under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
63. See id.
64. See Maldanado v. U.S. Bank & Mfrs. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762–63 (7th Cir. 1999).
65. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that the PDA does not require an employer to treat an employee afflicted with
morning sickness better than an employee who was tardy for any other health
reason).
66. For a more in-depth examination of how comparators affect proof structures in dis-
crimination cases, see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Dis-
crimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009).
67. See infra Part V for discussion of scholars arguing for pregnancy to be defined as a
disability. See also supra note 35 for EEOC guidelines.
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B. Family and Medical Leave Act
In addition to the PDA, which protects pregnant women from dis-
crimination, the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) provides an-
other benefit in the form of unpaid leave for pregnant workers.68 The law
allows employees (subject to certain threshold requirements)69 to take twelve
weeks of unpaid leave because of a qualifying medical condition, or to care
for a family member with a qualifying medical condition.70 Pregnancy is a
qualified condition under the FMLA.71 The Act allows employees to take
leave without fear of losing their jobs, continue receiving benefits through-
out the leave, and return to the same position they held prior to taking
leave.72
Despite this available protection, some workers still slip through the
cracks. Women working for smaller business are not covered by the
FMLA.73 Similarly, women who work in informal labor sectors are not cov-
ered by the FMLA because they are not statutory employees, and women
who are self-employed or independent contractors are also not covered.74
Further, women who work part-time or full-time for multiple employers
but not the requisite hours for one single employer are ineligible for unpaid
leave.75 As a result of these carve-outs, two-thirds of steadily employed
mothers are not covered by the FMLA.76
Additionally, because FMLA leave is unpaid, the law disproportionally
burdens pregnant workers of lesser socio-economic status because they can-
not afford to take unpaid leave.77 Some women may be afraid to take leave
68. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012).
69. In order for an employee to qualify, the FMLA requires that she work for an em-
ployer with more than fifty employees and has worked for the employer for more
than twelve months and for 1250 hours during the preceding year. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(2)(B)(iii).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 2611.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 2614.
73. The FMLA applies only to employers with 50 or more employees, thus it does not
apply to smaller businesses. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B).
74. Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Eradicating the Mothering Effect: Women as Workers and
Mothers, Successfully and Simultaneously, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 167,
186–87.
75. The FMLA defines an eligible employee as one who has been employed for at least
1,250 hours of service with one employer during the previous 12-month period. 29
U.S.C. § 2611.
76. Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2 (2005)
(“Coverage limitations mean that only about half of all workers, and less than one
third of steadily employed new mothers, receive these protections.”).
77. See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analy-
sis of the ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2012).
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under the FMLA for fear of retaliation or negative consequences.78 While
the Act contemplates this fear to some extent by including an anti-retalia-
tion provision,79 in practice, workers are still wary.80 Women also may be
unable to take FMLA leave during pregnancy if they need to save their
twelve weeks for leave after the child is born. Thus, the FMLA is a limited
federal benefit for pregnant workers because of statutory and practical
exclusions.
C. Americans with Disabilities Act
The PDA protects pregnant women from discrimination, and the
FMLA provides unpaid leave for pregnant workers, but no federal law pro-
vides workplace accommodations for pregnant workers. However, the recent
passage of state pregnancy accommodation laws may grant pregnant em-
ployees similar protection as the ADA. The ADA, passed in 1990, prohibits
discrimination against employees on the basis of their disability.81 Unlike
other federal discrimination protections, the ADA requires employers to
make reasonable accommodations for the protected class—disabled employ-
ees.82 Disability is one of only two protected classes under Title VII that
require workplace accommodations.83 However, employers do not have to
provide accommodations if doing so would create an undue hardship on the
employer.84 Despite a strong argument for its inclusion, pregnancy is not
per se a qualifying disability under the ADA.85
78. See Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing
Discourses and Social Change in the Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 11, 23–27 (2005).
79. Retaliation claims are assessed under the same framework as Title VII claims. See,
e.g., Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64 n.2 (1st Cir.
2002). Moreover, the employer can assert an affirmative defense by arguing that it
would have taken the same adverse employment action regardless of whether the
employee took leave.
80. Albiston, supra note 78, at 23 (“Some respondents worried that being fired would
not only deprive them of a job, but also harm their ability to find future
employment.”).
81. Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. 12112 (2009).
82. Id.
83. Employers requesting religious accommodation also have protection under Title VII,
but that is not relevant for this analysis.
84. 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5A) (2009).
85. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(h) (2011). Sheerine Almzadeh explained why pregnancy has
been historically excluded under the ADA:
As a health condition, pregnancy has long been denied per se designation as
a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The reasons
for this exclusion include common law depictions of pregnancy as a “natu-
ral physiological condition,” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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Because courts interpreted the ADA narrowly, Congress amended the
statute with the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA), expanding the definition of disabled.86 But in expanding the
coverage, Congress did not extend the ADA to include the large contingen-
cies of pregnant workers. Since the 2008 ADA Amendments, courts have
generally favored finding a disability under the expanded definition of disa-
bility.87 Except, of course, in cases of pregnancy.
Yet there can be some circumstances in which pregnancy causes a
qualifying disability.88 For example, in Cerrato v. Durham,89 the district
court noted that “pregnancy-related conditions including spotting, leaking,
cramping, dizziness, and nausea” may qualify as disabilities under the
ADA.90 Some courts have distinguished between “normal,” uncomplicated
pregnancies and complicated pregnancies.91 But, most courts have con-
cluded, despite the EEOC regulation to the contrary, that pregnant women
can never claim ADA protection.92 Some scholars argue that pregnancy itself
should be treated as a disability, and, as a result, pregnant women should
(EEOC) guidelines that explicitly rule out pregnancy as a disability, and
historical reticence in the feminist community to advocate for a pregnancy
rights framework grounded on the premise that pregnant women are dis-
abled persons.
Almzadeh, supra note 77, at 3.
86. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553
(2008).
87. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 521 (Aspen 8th ed.
2012) (“Individuals who would previously have been unlikely to have been deemed
disabled are finding a very different reception from the courts under the amended
statute. The overwhelming trend in the cases interpreting the ADAAA has been to
find a disability.”).
88. See Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (2002) (noting that “no
court currently maintains that pregnancy is per se a disability under the ADA”).
89. Gorman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (noting that some conditions resulting from preg-
nancy can trigger ADA protection even if EEOC guidelines state that pregnancy is
not a disability because it is not an impairment). See also Amanda G. Wachuta, Note,
The ADA Gets Even More Complicated: Analyzing Pregnancy With Complications as a
Disability, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 479 (2004) (noting that most cases addressing
disabilities as a result of pregnancy depend on whether the impairment is substan-
tially limiting).
90. Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
91. Cerrato, 941 F. Supp. at 393.
92. See Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (holding that a
plaintiff with prior back pain which was aggravated and worsened by her pregnancy
could be considered disabled under the ADA); Garrett v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd.
of Trs., 1996 WL 411319, at *3 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (holding that severe morning sick-
ness resulting from pregnancy could be considered a disability under the ADA).
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have similar workplace accommodations.93 Additionally, there is no legisla-
tive history to suggest that the ADA was intended to exclude pregnancy.94
The EEOC did not categorically exclude any other category that was not
originally included in the ADA.95 This Article explores pregnancy as a disa-
bility infra, but first analyzes the ADA to (1) examine the reasons that preg-
nancy is excluded and (2) provide a framework that states might adopt in
implementing their pregnancy accommodation laws.
1. Definition of Disability
Employers must treat disabled employees equal to other similarly-situ-
ated employees and must accommodate disabled employees in certain situa-
tions.96 There are three categories in which a person’s impairment could be
considered a disability under the ADA: first, being actually disabled; second,
having a record of a disability; and third, being regarded as having a disabil-
ity.97 Courts consider three elements when determining if an individual is
disabled under the statute: (1) whether the plaintiff’s condition is a physical
or mental impairment; (2) whether that impairment affects a major life ac-
tivity; and (3) whether the major life activity is substantially limited by the
impairment.98 For the “actual disability” and “record of disability” catego-
ries, a plaintiff must meet all three elements.99 However, for the “regarded as
disability” category, a plaintiff does not need to meet the elements; an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against an employee because it believes she is
disabled, regardless of whether that assumption is true.
93. See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan.
1996); Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex.
1995); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995);
Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., 1993 WL 101196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
94. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 37, at 452 (arguing that the reluctance to associate preg-
nancy with disability has negatively affected pregnant workers). Cf. Brake & Gross-
man, supra note 43, at 70 (arguing that categorizing pregnancy as a disability would
help, but there is still value in treating it as a distinct sex equality right).
95. Alemzadeh, supra note 77, at 13.
96. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (1990). Under the statute there are three definitions of disa-
bility: a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit one or more of the
major life activities of an individual; a record of such an impairment; or being re-
garded as having such an impairment.
98. Id.
99. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). See generally 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A)
(illustrating major life activities: “caring for oneself, performing manual task, seeing,
hearing, eating, walking, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, reading, concentrat-
ing, thinking, communicating and working”).
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a. Actual Disability
The Act defines disability broadly to include physical and mental con-
ditions.100 It does not, however, include protection for persons with short-
term disabilities.101 Physical characteristics, such as height, weight, age, eye
color, and general aging cannot be the basis of an impairment.102 Character
traits, such as literacy, socio-economic status, and common personality
traits, are similarly excluded.103 Voluntary conditions, such as pregnancy, are
generally not considered impairments.104 If an employee is actually disabled,
then an employer cannot discriminate against her in hiring, firing, or condi-
tions of employment, and must accommodate her disability.105
b. Record of a Disability
Under Section 3(2) of the ADA, a person with a “record” of an im-
pairment that substantially limits a major life activity can be considered
disabled.106 The record includes employment records, medical records, and
education records.107 The impairment in the record must indicate that it
would substantially limit one or more of the employee’s major life activi-
ties.108 For example, the EEOC interprets the statute to protect former can-
cer patients from discrimination.109 In such a situation, the EEOC states
that employers must provide a continuous accommodation for the em-
ployee, even if her impairment no longer affects major life activities.110
While this seems like a broad employer liability, the “record of” disability
under the ADA has rarely been invoked.111 Furthermore, because pregnancy
100. 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1990). The ADA defines a physical or mental impairment as:
(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or an-
atomical loss affecting one or more body system, such as neurological, mus-
culoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or psychological
disorder, such as intellectual disability (formerly termed ‘mental retarda-
tion’), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001) (pre-ADAAA version).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix) (2012).
102. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(h) (2011).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h).
106. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B).
108. Id.
109. 29 C.F.R. app. § 16320.2(k).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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is not an impairment under the statute in the first instance, accommodation
relating to childbirth and parenting would not be covered under this prong.
c. Regarded as Having a Disability
The 2008 ADA Amendments substantially altered protections for
Americans with disabilities by revamping the “regarded as” category under
the definition of disability.112 An employee will meet this requirement if she
has been discriminated against because an employer accurately or inaccu-
rately perceived her as having an impairment that limits a major life activ-
ity.113 Notably, the employee does not have to have an actual disability.
While an employee may not be discriminated against for being regarded as
disabled, she is not entitled to an accommodation unless she has an actual
disability or has a record of a disability.114 For example, an employer could
fire a left-handed employee because the employer perceived her to be dis-
abled. The employee would have a viable discrimination claim under the
ADAAA, but would not be entitled to an accommodation without an actual
disability. That 2008 amendment to the ADA provides broad protection in
the workplace for persons with (or perceived to be with) disabilities.115
2. Accommodation Requirements
If an employee is “qualified,” meaning she can perform the essential
functions of the job, and she has a disability under any of the three previ-
ously defined disability prongs, then an employer may not discriminate
against her on the basis of her disability.116 This scheme intends to balance
the autonomy of employers with the rights of disabled workers. Moreover, if
the employee has an actual disability, the employer must provide reasonable
accommodations to her.117 However, the employer must know of that disa-
bility.118 Accordingly, the employer has no affirmative duty to investigate
whether an employee has a disability and needs an accommodation. If the
112. See generally Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened to) The ADA’s “Record Of” Prong (?),
81 WASH. L. REV. 669 (2006).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)–(B).
114. Id.
115. See generally Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer’s Duty to
Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603 (1998).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Wells v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Medical Ctr., 860 F. Supp. 2d 469,
478 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (holding that a plaintiff who underwent medical care but was
otherwise fit for work put forth evidence to support a prima facie case of “regarded
as” discrimination after being fired).
118. Rogers v. CH2M Hill, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that em-
ployee’s depression was not so obvious for the employer to have actual knowledge
and thus trigger the duty to accommodate).
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employee is having difficulty with her job, the employer may inquire into
whether an accommodation is needed, but it is not required to do so.119
As discussed infra, states will have to determine the scope of their
pregnancy accommodation laws’ requirements and the ADA could provide
an optimal framework for doing so. In particular, some state courts will
have to determine whether there is an affirmative duty for the employee to
ask for an accommodation. If states follow the ADA, then the laws will
place the burden on pregnant employees to seek accommodations.
3. Employer Defenses
There are instances in which the employer would be free to discrimi-
nate on the basis of disability or would not be required to accommodate an
individual with a disability. First, an employer does not have to hire an
applicant with a disability if she is unable to perform the essential functions
of the position with or without an accommodation.120 Second, an employer
does not have to provide a reasonable accommodation if doing so would
create an undue hardship for the employer.121
Despite the ADA’s exclusion of pregnancy,122 the statute is vital to
understanding the potential scope and procedures of the recently enacted
state pregnancy accommodation laws. It will likely guide state courts in de-
termining: when a pregnancy (akin to disability under ADA) disqualifies a
worker from a position because she is unable to perform the essential func-
tions of the job; what constitutes reasonable accommodations; what consti-
tutes undue burden; and whether there is an affirmative duty to
accommodate absent an employee’s request.
D. Proposed Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (Federal)
As previously discussed, the PDA does not require accommodation for
pregnant workers unless similarly-situated, non-pregnant employees receive
such an accommodation. Although courts and the PDA regulations have
held that pregnancy itself is not a disability, legislators have proposed enact-
119. These accommodations might include: making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible, job restructuring, part-time or modified schedules, reassignment to
a different position, and additional training. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). The
ADAAA does not require accommodation of employees regarded as having a disabil-
ity, it only prevents discrimination against those individuals. It does, however, re-
quire accommodation for employees with a record of disability. For instance, a
cancer patient in remission with a record of impairment that needed to seek addi-
tional treatment or testing would probably qualify for an accommodation.
120. C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
121. Id.
122. 42 USCA § 12101.
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ing protections that would treat it as such. Congress has attempted multiple
times to pass the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.123 The bill would require
employers to make reasonable accommodations for their employees who
have physical limitations because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions.124 For example, an employer might be required to allow an
employee to take water breaks, to provide her a stool to rest (if possible),
and reassign her from heavy lifting duties to lighter duties.125 Similar to the
ADA framework, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act would not require em-
ployers to provide such accommodations if doing so would create an undue
hardship for them. The law has been opposed by numerous Congresses.126
In sum, pregnant women are partially protected in the workplace
under the current federal scheme but receive no added benefits or accom-
modations. The PDA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
of pregnancy in hiring. In reality, an employer might still discriminate, but
use a non-discriminatory justification in deciding not to hire a pregnant
applicant. There are limits to which the law can prevent employers from
hiding their discriminatory intent. Although the PDA prohibits an em-
ployer from firing a pregnant worker because she is pregnant, an employer is
free to terminate the pregnant woman if her pregnancy is affecting her job
performance—and the employer provides no accommodations to any other
employee. The ADA provides accommodation to workers with physical dis-
abilities, but that accommodation does not extend to pregnant workers with
equal physical challenges, despite increased protections under the 2008
ADA amendments. The FMLA provides unpaid leave to pregnant workers;
however, many women are financially unable to use the leave, or are saving
it for after their children are born. Thus, pregnant workers of lower-
socioeconomic status are most likely to be in need of a workplace accommo-
dation, but currently no federal law providing such accommodations exists.
123. Id.
124. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1975, 113th Cong. § (2013); Preg-
nant Workers Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. § (2012). See also
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., FACT SHEET, THE PREGNANT WORKERS FAIRNESS
ACT: MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY ON THE JOB 2 (2013), http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnantworkersfairnessfactsheet_w_bill_number.pdf. As
previously discussed, some pregnancy-related conditions can be considered disabili-
ties under the ADA but only a few courts have adopted such a position and in
limited circumstances. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
125. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-1975 (2013); H.R. REP. NO. 112-5647 (2012). For all
intents and purposes the text of the 112th and 113th Congresses are the same and
are referred to interchangeably.
126. H.R. REP. NO. 113-1975 (2013).
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II. NEW JERSEY PREGNANT WORKER’S FAIRNESS ACT AND SIMILAR
STATE ACCOMMODATION LAWS
Despite the failure to pass more robust workplace protections for preg-
nant workers at the federal level, numerous states and several cities recently
have passed statutes requiring accommodations for pregnant workers.127
This section examines the New Jersey Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act as a
model state law. While there are some variations, New Jersey’s statute is
representative of the recent state accommodation laws. As of December
2014, twelve states and five cities have passed accommodation laws.128 Re-
markably, they were almost all passed within the last two years, perhaps
indicative of a concern for pregnant women in the workplace. Those are
positive developments, but there is still much uncertainty regarding scope,
implementation, and enforcement. New Jersey provides some clear examples
of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation (e.g., bathroom breaks,
change in schedule, etc.), and other examples can be gleaned from existing
ADA case law.129
A. New Jersey Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act
In January 2014, Governor Chris Christie signed the New Jersey Preg-
nant Worker’s Fairness Act into law.130 The Act amends the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination (NJLAD) and imposes an accommodation require-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR
PREGNANT WORKERS: STATE AND LOCAL LAWS, FACT SHEET (2014), http://
www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/pregnancy-discrim-
ination/reasonable-accommodations-for-pregnant-workers-state-laws.pdf [hereinafter
FACT SHEET, STATE AND LOCAL LAWS]; Haverstick, supra note 39; Schulte, supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
130. FACT SHEET, STATE AND LOCAL LAWS, supra note 129. The twelve states are:
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, and West Virginia. ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520
(2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12945, 12926 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 46a-60(a)(7), 46a-51 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711, 716 (West
2014); Haw. Code R. § 12-46-107 (1990); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101, 102
(2014); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:342, 23-341 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T
§§ 20–609, 20-601 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 181.940, 181.9414, 181.9436
(2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(s) (West 2014); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
§ 180.004 (2001); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11b-1 et seq. (2014). In addition, New York
City, Philadelphia, Providence, and the District of Columbia have passed similar
laws. New York, N.Y., Int. No. 974-A (Oct. 2, 2013); Philadelphia, Pa., Code § 9-
1128 (2014); (to be codified at) Providence, R.I., Code §§ 16-54, -57, -84 (2014);
Protecting Pregnant Workers Fairness Act of 2014, D.C. Act. 20-458 (2014).
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ment for employers.131 First, it adds pregnant workers as an explicitly pro-
tected class.132 The Act defines pregnancy broadly in the employment
context, as “pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to preg-
nancy or childbirth, including recovery from childbirth.”133 Second, it re-
quires employers to treat employees whom they know or should know are
pregnant no less favorably than similarly-situated employees.134 The “should
know” requirement goes further than the federal PDA.135 Third, it requires
reasonable accommodation in the workplace, “such as bathroom breaks,
breaks for increased water intake, periodic rest, assistance with manual la-
bor, job restructuring or modified work schedules, and temporary transfers
to less strenuous or hazardous work, for needs related to the pregnancy
when the employee, based on the advice of her physician, requests the ac-
commodation . . . .”136 Like the ADA, there is an undue hardship provision,
which exempts the employer from providing accommodation if such ac-
commodations would be an undue hardship on the business operations of
the employer.137
B. Defining Accommodation
One of the largest questions that will arise with the passage of preg-
nancy accommodation law is to what extent accommodation is required.
Under the New Jersey statute, the legislature provides guidance for what
constitutes an undue hardship and lists factors for consideration including:
[T]he overall size of the employer’s business with respect to the
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of
budget; the type of the employer’s operations, including the
composition and structure of the employer’s workforce; the na-
ture and cost of the accommodation needed, taking into consid-
eration the availability of tax credits, tax deductions, and outside
funding; and the extent to which the accommodation would in-
volve waiver of an essential requirement of a job as opposed to a
tangential or non-business necessity requirement.138
131. N.J. STAT. ANN., § 10:5-12(S) (WEST 2014).
132. Lauren Khouri, He Signed It! New Jersey Expands Protection for Pregnant Workers,
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://nwlc.org/he-signed-it-new-
jersey-expands-protection-pregnant-workers/.
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The specifics in the New Jersey law are somewhat similar to the ADA and
could be a model for other states. The statute requires the employee to
request the accommodation under advice of her physician.139 This could be
a significant limitation and will protect employers from frivolous claims by
requiring a valid medical reason for the accommodation. Like the ADA, the
statute requires the employee to make the request for such an
accommodation.140
The reasonable accommodation requirement will positively benefit
pregnant employees. For example, take the case of Heather Wiseman. Wise-
man was an employee of Wal-Mart for seven months when she became
pregnant.141 At that time, she informed her employer she was pregnant and
had a medical condition (urinary tract and bladder infections), requiring her
to consume adequate amounts of water.142 Her doctor advised her to carry a
water bottle while at work.143 Shortly after Wiseman began following the
advice of her doctor, Wal-Mart changed its policy to forbid non-cashiers
from carrying water bottles and told her to cease doing so.144 Wiseman
worked in a fitting room area and continued to carry a water bottle as her
doctor had advised.145 She was subsequently fired for insubordination.146
Wiseman brought suit under Title VII, claiming pregnancy discrimination,
and a violation under the FMLA.147 Her claims for both counts were dis-
missed.148 The District of Kansas held that she could not establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because she could not prove she was “treated less
favorably than others who were not pregnant but were similar in their abil-
ity or inability to work.”149 In other words, Wal-Mart would have fired any
employee who carried a water bottle in violation of its policy.
Now suppose this same scenario happened in 2015 in the state of New
Jersey. Wiseman was a pregnant worker who asked for an accommodation
under advice of her doctor. She meets the first requirement of the Preg-
nancy Fairness Act. Then the analysis would turn to the reasonableness of
the accommodation itself—requesting to carry a water bottle. In addition to





143. Memorandum and Ord. at 2, Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM,
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statute seems to provide for such an accommodation explicitly by stating
that the employer must provide accommodations such as “breaks for in-
creased water intake.”150 Moreover, an employer could not discriminate
against or penalize the employee for requesting such an accommodation.151
Under New Jersey law, Heather Wiseman would probably not have been
fired, and, in fact, would have been provided a reasonable accommodation
that allowed her to continue working.
The district court in Wiseman stated that the plaintiff was conflating
the ADA and the PDA by arguing for treatment similar to that a disabled
employee would receive.152 In New Jersey, the Pregnant Workers Fairness
Act seems to require just that. It is likely that state courts will look to ADA
guidelines and case law in interpreting the reasonable accommodation pro-
vision of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. Although there is currently no
case law concerning the Act, employers would be prudent to structure their
employee guidelines and policies for pregnant workers in the same manner
as their guidelines and policies for disabled workers.
1. “Should Know”
One question and potential problem that will arise under the New
Jersey statute is the requirement of non-discrimination for employers that
know or “should know” an employee is pregnant. The Act forbids an em-
ployer “to treat . . . a woman employee that the employer knows, or should
know, is affected by pregnancy in a manner less favorable than the treat-
ment of other persons not affected by pregnancy but similar in their ability
or inability to work.”153 The “should know” provision of the statute is best
interpreted as a constructive notice requirement. Given the private nature of
a woman’s pregnancy, it may be difficult, and in fact offensive, to require an
employer to investigate into a woman’s pregnancy status. That inquiry in
itself could create numerous human resource problems and, depending on
the circumstance, legal issues as well. Although the PDA does not explicitly
prohibit an employer from asking an employee or applicant about her preg-
nancy status, the EEOC warns against it because such a question could
create suspicion of an intent to discriminate.154
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(s) (West 2014).
153. Id.
154. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
pregnancy_guidance.cfm#IV (last accessed Mar. 16, 2016).
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Accordingly, employers will have to make careful considerations re-
garding pregnancy policies and accommodations. Perhaps employers should
have policies that allow women to report their pregnancies. For example, the
EEOC already lists best practices for employers to comply with the ADA
and PDA.155 One of the very first suggestions is “ensure . . . the policy
provides multiple avenues of complaint.” Indeed, identifying problems (or
potential problems) in the workplace is the first step for employers to come
into compliance with pregnancy discrimination and accommodation laws.
2. “Undue burden”
Similar to the ADA, the New Jersey Pregnant Worker’s Fairness Act
does not require an employer to provide an accommodation if doing so
would create an undue hardship.156 Again, it is likely that state courts will
look to the regulations and case law of the ADA to determine what consti-
tutes an undue hardship on the business operations of the employer. While
an employer may be fairly confident that allowing a water bottle in a fitting
room is a reasonable accommodation, it may be equally unsure whether
transferring a pregnant worker to a different position would be reasonable.
The PDA has taken an approach that encourages employers to not ask
about the status of an employee’s pregnancy. As previously discussed, the
PDA does not forbid an employer from asking about an employee’s preg-
nancy, but the EEOC has advised against such practice because asking
about a worker’s potential pregnancy could create evidence of an intent to
discriminate.157 There is no need for an employer to ask and the pregnancy
has no legal bearing on her employment. If the employee is able to do the
job, then the employer cannot fire her because of her pregnancy. Thus, her
pregnancy is irrelevant unless the woman divulges it to her employer be-
cause she is unable to perform her job. However, given the rise in state
pregnancy accommodation laws, it is prudent for employers to examine
their pregnancy policies.
The most prudent solution for employers is to adopt policies similar
to their policies for disabled employees. Employers should have a robust
reporting system for pregnant workers to request accommodations, and en-
sure that employees are aware of the proper procedures. They should clearly
155. Id.
156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(s) (West 2014).
157. EEOC, Pregnancy Discrimination – FAQs, http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/preg-
nancy2.html#Q10 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (“Federal law does not prohibit em-
ployers from asking you whether you are or intend to become pregnant. However,
because such questions may indicate a possible intent to discriminate based on preg-
nancy, we recommend that employers avoid these types of questions.”).
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explain the reporting procedures in the handbook and display posters in the
workplace. Then, if employees do not take advantage of the reporting sys-
tem, employers would presumptively lack knowledge. New Jersey and other
states should look to the ADA as a model for implementing their state ac-
commodation laws. Although only a federal law could provide uniformity
to pregnancy accommodation, the fact that states use language identical to
the ADA indicates the probability that the structure of accommodation laws
will parallel disability laws.
III. ARGUMENT FOR PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION LAWS
Despite some potential criticism, and resistance,158 pregnancy accom-
modation laws are ultimately a positive and vital development for women in
the workforce. Some pregnant women need accommodations to continue
working without risking their health or losing their jobs. First, this section
examines the opposition to pregnancy accommodation laws. Then, it ad-
dresses the benefits of accommodation laws and focuses on three positive
potential effects: (1) an increase in pregnant women’s participation in the
workplace; (2) economic benefits to both employers and women (particu-
larly blue-collar workers); and (3) the granting of a needed protection for
women who must continue working during their pregnancy.
A. Reasons for Opposition
Despite the recent explosion of state laws, accommodation require-
ments are required in only a minority of states. At the federal level, the
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act has been opposed every time it has been
introduced.159 In the past two Congresses, the Republican-controlled House
opposed the bill,160 although it is unclear why Republicans were unani-
mously opposed to the bill. One commentator noted that, “there isn’t any
articulated opposition from Republican offices. And giving workers a stool
rather than making them stand all day—it’s very hard to articulate why
158. Id.
159. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
160. Cf. Danielle Paquette, Why Women Are Afraid to Tell Employers They’re Pregnant,
WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:41 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2015/04/21/why-women-are-afraid-to-tell-employers-theyre-preg-
nant/ (“Female workers frequently avoided asking for help or special accommoda-
tions, researchers found. High rank didn’t quell worries: Entry level employees and
managers expressed similar fears. Some hid their pregnancies for as long as possible.
Reported one woman, anonymous in the study: ‘I have this perception that as I
become rounder, I’m going to become ‘cuter,’ and cuter is not professional. So [I
have] a little mixed emotion about other people I work with noticing [that I’m
pregnant].’ ”).
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you’re against that.”161 The one consistent explanation, although not a co-
hesive policy stance, has been the theory that accommodation laws are an
“unfair burden on businesses.”162 That argument has been a perennial con-
cern for the advancement of workplace rights in general.163 First, the text of
the bill does not require an employer to provide an accommodation if doing
so would create an undue hardship.164 Second, many argue that the accom-
161. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., FACT SHEET, THE PREGNANT WORKERS FAIRNESS
ACT: MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY ON THE JOB (2013), http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnantworkersfairnessfactsheet_w_bill_number.pdf.
162. Schulte, supra note 35. See Marsha Mercer, States Go Beyond Federal Law to Protect
Pregnant Workers, PEW TRUSTS (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/1/07/states-go-beyond-federal-law-to-pro-
tect-pregnant-workers (“Additional protections for pregnant workers are less popular
on Capitol Hill, where a new federal measure proposed by Democrats, the Pregnant
Workers Fairness Act, has failed to garner any Republican support. GOP opponents
contend the law would place an unfair burden on businesses.”); Christina Wilkie,
Workplace Pregnancy Bill Introduced Despite Opposition, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
25, 2013, 4:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/25/workplace-preg-
nancy-bill-opposition_n_1914062.html (“The Republican-controlled House has
consistently opposed workplace bills like PWFA, which they argue place an unneces-
sary burden on businesses, lowering overall profits. The Senate is similarly
inclined.”).
163. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Subtle Vices of the Employment Discrimination
Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 575, 583(1996). Professor Epstein discussed the
economic costs of Title VII:
Any sound overall assessment cannot ignore the material effects that such
litigation has on the creation of new jobs for other workers. . . . The effects
are likely to be large and significant, but they also will be hidden from view.
They may involve decisions on where to build the next new plant; or to
decide which of two plants the firm will expand and by how much; or to
decide which plant the firm will shut down. Civil rights laws also might
influence the types of capital equipment that companies purchase, or the
kinds of new jobs they create. They surely influence the percentage of indi-
viduals who companies will hire as employees covered under the Civil
Rights Act, compared to the percentage of work that will be set out on a
piecework basis to independent contractors to whom the Civil Rights Act
does not apply. It is no accident that the rate of independent contracting,
e.g., the number of temporary workers in the United States, is increasing
rapidly. A key motivation for this trend is to enable employers to escape the
burdens associated with civil rights laws and other so-called protective em-
ployment laws.
Id.
164. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1975, 113th Cong. § 2(1) (2013) (“[It
is unlawful to] not make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations re-
lated to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a job applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity.”).
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modation laws would not be costly and would in fact provide economic
benefits to employers and workers. These arguments are discussed below.
In addition to the possible detriments to businesses, some commenta-
tors have expressed concerns that providing an accommodation to pregnant
women would further harm the already stigmatized workers.165 Some em-
ployers already view pregnant workers as less than capable, even when they
perform their jobs without needing an accommodation.166 In such situa-
tions, accommodations for pregnant women would further exacerbate these
negative stereotypes by reinforcing the idea that pregnant women cannot
perform their jobs without special treatment. The “equal treatment” argu-
ment addresses this problem by opposing accommodations and preferential
treatment for pregnant women in the workplace.167 A further concern is
that women of color, single women, and economically disadvantaged work-
ers are more likely to be viewed as “bad mothers” for continuing to work
while pregnant.168 However, the stereotypes about pregnant women in the
workforce exist in spite of favorable laws, not because of them. Title VII did
not cause employers to have discriminatory attitudes towards women. On
the contrary, it sought to eliminate such animus by expressly prohibiting
discrimination.169 If pregnant women are not permitted reasonable accom-
modations while working, women will be pushed out of the workforce, just
165. See Epstein, supra note 164. Although Professor Epstein does not address accommo-
dation laws specifically, he argues that that general discrimination laws have negative
economic benefits to companies.
166. Researchers found that “[f]emale workers frequently avoided asking for help or spe-
cial accommodations.” See Paquette, supra note 161. See also Alissa Quart, Why
Women Hide Their Pregnancies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/opinion/sunday/why-women-hide-their-
pregnancies.html (“Although federal law prohibits companies with 15 or more em-
ployees from discriminating against pregnant job seekers, it can be quite hard for an
ordinary woman to land a job if she lets prospective bosses know she is pregnant.”).
167. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-370 (1985).
168. Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies
for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Careers” in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 31, 35 (2006) (“[T]he findings of social science research documenting over-
whelmingly negative stereotypes about the competence and commitment of pregnant
women and mothers. . . . Another study showed that pregnant women, as compared
to nonpregnant women, are subjected to lower performance ratings based on identi-
cal behavior and other available information. Such rating likely reflect the stereotypes
that pregnant women will become less available and committed to their jobs and that
they pose risks to their employer because they will likely not return to work at the
conclusion of their maternity leave.”).
169. Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Im-
pact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 306
(1983) (“Congress sought to improve the lot of traditionally victimized minorities
both by eliminating blatant injustices stemming from intentional discrimination and
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as sex discrimination forced women out of the workplace before Title
VII.170 Similar to the positive benefits of Title VII, pregnancy accommoda-
tion laws will benefit pregnant women by allowing them to continue work-
ing without fear of discrimination.
B. Increasing Pregnant Women’s Rights in the Workplace
Ultimately, pregnancy accommodation laws will allow women to con-
tinue working when they would have been previously unable to without an
accommodation—or would have risked losing their jobs by asking for an
accommodation. The passage of the PDA increased the participation of
married women and pregnant women in the workforce and helped create a
dynamic model for labor force participation.171 Moreover, the PDA’s un-
paid leave requirement further increased labor force participation for
women with children.172 Providing protection for pregnant workers is cru-
cial to ensuring their participation.
One might argue that requiring employers to accommodate women
will discourage employers from hiring women of childbearing age in the
first instance.173 This assumption is too attenuated to withstand scrutiny
and could be applied to a host of similar historical workplace protections.
For instance, during the passage of Title VII itself and the subsequent PDA,
it could have been said that employers would be less likely to hire women
because of the threat of litigation. Again, this could be applied to workers
with disabilities and workers of a protected race or national origin. But pro-
tective laws have not decreased hiring of those groups; they have actually
accomplished the opposite result.174
by creating employment opportunities that would provide the economic power to
propel these groups into the mainstream of American society.”).
170. Brake & Grossman, supra note 43, at 106 (“Women of color, single women, and
economically vulnerable women who must navigate the cultural fault-lines for work-
ing mothers are susceptible to charges of being bad mothers, irresponsible for having
children at all, or for having too many children. At the same time, they are expected
to continue working without ‘special’ accommodation, a sentiment reflected in the
harsh judgments reserved for ‘welfare mothers’ who are dependent on state
support.”).
171. Sankar Mukhopadhyay, The Effects of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act on Fe-
male Labor Supply, INT’L ECON. REV. 1133, 1150 (2012).
172. Id.
173. See Williams & Westfall, supra note 168, at 35 (“The stereotype that women who
become pregnant will lose interest in their jobs, if taken to its logical extreme, may
cause employers to be reluctant to hire women whom they fear might become preg-
nant.”). Although this statement is applied to PDA in general, proving extra protec-
tions in the form of accommodations could further exacerbate the fear that
employers will not hire pregnant women.
174. Id.
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State accommodation laws will similarly allow women to continue
working while pregnant (if they wish) and thus increase their overall
workforce participation and earnings. Despite the gaps in the law, the PDA
has been successful in protecting pregnant women from employment dis-
crimination and increasing their participation.175 There are numerous obsta-
cles for pregnant women and mothers in the workplace that stem from a
culture of hostility and not from formal legal equality. In fact, Title VII and
subsequent litigation have been imperative in overcoming the “maternal
wall,” which limits the ceiling of women’s success.176 State accommodation
laws (and maybe one day an analogous federal law) will further increase
women’s progress. Since the PDA was first passed in 1978, pay equality and
the gender pay gap have continued to be relevant. State accommodation
laws that allow women to continue working during their pregnancy, and
thus reduce missed time, will help to achieve parity.177 Moreover, it is a just
imperative to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers like
we do for disabled workers.
Many scholars have argued for the expansion of the PDA to model the
ADA, or for the inclusion of pregnancy as a disability under the ADA.178
This argument very much represents what states are doing at the local level
to protect their workers. There are good reasons to treat the two conditions
similarly and protect them equally. First, as previously discussed, ADA regu-
lations direct courts to construe the statute broadly, classifying a wide range
175. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO.
L.J. 567, 569 (2009) (“Without a doubt, the PDA successfully opened workplace
doors for pregnant women. It brought an abrupt end to common employer policies
that categorically excluded pregnant women or restricted the terms on which they
could work.”).
176. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond The Maternal Wall: Relief For Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77,
78–79 (2003). Professors Williams and Segal challenge the accepted wisdom that
Title VII is an ineffective solution for advancing mothers in the workplace:
We have identified over twenty cases—some with substantial monetary
awards—in which the courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs who have
attempted to move beyond the maternal wall. These cases, based on federal
and state statutes, state public policies, and constitutional rights, have given
rise to roughly ten viable legal theories. Both male and female family
caregivers have successfully challenged such treatment. In addition, case law
contains clear lessons about what to do and what not to do when litigating
these claims—advice that will be of interest to both plaintiffs’ and manage-
ment-side lawyers.
Id.
177. Grossman, supra note 175, at 569.
178. Williams & Segal, supra note 177.
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of impairments as disabilities.179 Thus, the law is intended to be a workplace
protection for workers with physical limitations. Many physical disabilities,
such as hypertension, back pain, or diabetes, often impose the same physical
limitations on an employee’s ability to work that pregnant women might
experience.180 Pregnant women might need the same accommodations that
their disabled coworkers require, such as increased breaks or help lifting
heavy objects. There is no way to distinguish these impairments other than
their cause—some are a result of pregnancy and some are a result of any
other medical condition that is recognized by the ADA. One might argue
that the difference is that pregnancy is a more common occurrence. But the
ADA does not forbid a finding of disability simply because the impairment
is common. In fact, hypertension, back pain, and diabetes—all potential
disabilities—are quite common.181 Thus, it is quite contrary to the purpose
and plain interpretation of the ADA to exclude pregnancy because the phys-
ical limitations that result from pregnancy are indistinguishable from other
covered conditions. Such exclusion has had negative consequences for preg-
nant women, and state accommodations laws will fill this gap in the law.
Despite the benefits of state accommodation laws, one potential prob-
lem is the enforcement of such laws. In New York City, where an accommo-
dation law has been passed, women still experience discrimination.182
Pregnancy accommodation laws are new and many women are not aware of
their legal rights.183 Even if they are aware, some women, especially those of
lesser socioeconomic status, may not file complaints for fear of losing their
jobs. However, the difficulty of enforcing accommodation laws (and work-
place protections more generally) should not deter the proliferation of such
laws. That problem will slowly erode as more and more protections are
provided and employees become aware of their entitlement to accommoda-
179. See, e.g., Ann Friedman, Women Can’t End the Wage Gap on Their Own, NEW YORK
MAG. (Apr. 12, 2015, 8:25 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/04/women-cant-
end-the-wage-gap-on-their-own.html; Claire Cain Miller, Pay Gap is Because of Gen-
der, Not Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/
upshot/the-pay-gap-is-because-of-gender-not-jobs.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1.;
Claire Cain Miller, Pay Gap Is Smaller Than Ever, and Still Stubbornly Large, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/upshot/pay-gap-is-
smaller-than-ever-and-still-stubbornly-large.html?abt=0002&abg=1; Brigid Schulte,
The Wage Gap: A Primer, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/local/wp/2014/10/02/the-wage-gap-a-primer/.
180. Michelle A. Travis, Disabling the Gender Pay Gap: Lessons from the Social Model of
Disability, 91 DENV. U.L. REV. 893 (2013) (examining how a pregnancy model
based off the disability model might close the pay gap).
181. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 37; Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the
Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995).
182. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
183. See Alemzadeh, supra note 77, at 14.
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tions, though this will take time. Even so, the issue of enforcing the law is
still separate from the merits of accommodation laws themselves. The law
changes employers’ policies, practices, and guidelines. Once protections are
in place and litigation begins, employers adjust accordingly and begin to act
affirmatively to avoid litigation and be in compliance with the law.
C. Economic Benefits
Although it may seem costly to businesses to provide accommodation
to pregnant women, there has been no proof of negative economic effects to
employers,184 and there are benefits to women and employers alike.
1. To Pregnant Women
The economic benefits of accommodations to pregnant workers are
obvious—they can continue working and earning income during their preg-
nancy and they do not have to fear losing their jobs. Moreover, the pregnant
women who need reasonable accommodations at work are most likely of
lower socio-economic status to begin with. Women in white-collar jobs are
not likely to need an accommodation because they are not performing phys-
ical labor. A pregnant attorney can have water at her desk while she works,
or rest her feet on her office chair. An insurance agent does not have to
worry about requesting light-duty to avoid lifting 70-pound boxes. But a
waitress who is on her feet all day carrying heavy trays may need more
frequent breaks and assistance carrying food; a bathroom attendant at a
department store may need a temporary transfer to avoid sniffing dangerous
chemicals. Such reasonable accommodations would often be taken for
granted in white-collar jobs. Thus, pregnancy accommodations are most
critical to low-salary, blue-collar workers who financially need to continue
working.
This is not to suggest that the disproportionate need of blue-collar
women does not have advantages for all pregnant workers. There may be
situations when a woman needs an accommodation to continue working
but does not necessarily need to work. One may argue that her savings or
partner’s income is sufficient. Financial necessity is not the touchstone of
whether a pregnant woman should be granted an accommodation. On the
184. Epstein, supra note 164, at 583.
Tracing down these consequences will be hard. Firms are not likely to an-
nounce that their decisions are made to minimize the adverse effects of the
civil rights laws. They are not likely to broadcast their strategy. The effects
are likely to be large and significant, but they also will be hidden from view.
Id.
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contrary, the reasonableness of the accommodation is the proper inquiry.
Although workers with lower socioeconomic status need accommodations
the most, it is not a means-tested right. Regardless of one’s relative wealth, a
pregnant worker’s ability to continue working and to not lose her job is a
definite economic benefit of accommodation laws.
2. To Employers
Despite the possibility of some costs, providing accommodations in
the workplace could actually help businesses’ economic success.185 First, any
potential cost of reasonable accommodations is nominal, such as water
breaks and schedule adjustments.186 Second, there are other benefits to pro-
viding pregnancy accommodations: improved recruitment and retention of
employees; increased employee commitment; increased productivity; re-
duced absenteeism; and increased diversity.187 The bottom-line for employ-
ers will not be affected at all, or will be positively affected, by providing
accommodations to their pregnant workers.188
Delaware recognized the potential for state accommodation laws to
benefit employers when it passed its own bipartisan law. State Senator Beth-
any Hall-Long recognized that her state’s accommodation law would be
good for business, and a unanimous state legislature agreed; the bill was co-
sponsored by conservative republicans.189 Senator Hall-Long explained:
This makes common sense not just for maternal and child
health, but as good, sound economics. Women are more and
185. See generally Fact Sheet, The Business Case for Accommodating Pregnant Workers, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Dec. 2013), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/preg-
nant_workers_business_case_12.04.12.pdf.
186. Id. at 3 (“Research also demonstrates that costs associated with providing these ac-
commodations can typically be expected to be minimal and temporary. The bottom
line benefit to businesses is just one of the many reasons to ensure that reasonable
accommodations are available to pregnant workers.”).
187. Id.
188. See Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-
job.html?_r=0 (“Finally, employers might consider that providing accommodations
to pregnant workers would even be good for the bottom line, in the form of reduced
turnover, increased loyalty and productivity and healthier workers. With minor job
modifications, a woman might be able to work up until the delivery of her child and
return to work fairly soon after giving birth. If she were forced out instead, her
employer would waste time and money finding a replacement. In the worst-case
scenario, employers could be responsible for much higher medical costs if their
workers were afraid to ask for accommodations and instead continued doing work
that endangered their pregnancies.”).
189. Schulte, supra note 35.
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more the lead breadwinners of their families. If you make them
use up all their leave before they give birth, or terminate their
employment because they need an accommodation, you have
created an economic situation for that family that then may need
to rely on Medicaid, and other public social supports.190
Delaware State Senator Colin Bonini agreed that as a fiscal conservative he
did not want women losing their jobs and becoming dependent on public
assistance.191 In addition to the economic benefits for businesses, Senator
Long-Hall focused on the company morale and employee retention, noting
that “businesses with a strategic vision embraced this. A simple accommoda-
tion is so much easier than laying someone off, terminating them, then
having to bring someone else on and retrain them.”192 Indeed, it makes
common sense for employers to foster a collegial work environment, in-
crease productivity through support in the form of accommodations, and
retain employees by making small adjustments.
In sum, pregnancy accommodation laws will have a positive impact
for pregnant women in the workforce at minimal to no cost to employers.
While negative stereotypes about the competency of pregnant workers is a
legitimate concern, it is not enough to outweigh the concerns of pregnant
workers who need accommodations to continue working—quite often to
survive financially. The women who need to continue working will do so,
and without accommodations, which may have negative consequences for
their own health and the health of their unborn children.193 There is strong
support for pregnancy accommodations in the workplace, evidenced by the
190. Id.
191. Mercer, supra note 163.
192. Schulte, supra note 35.
193. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the health effects of women working
while pregnant, but it can be assumed that there could be negative health conse-
quences if a doctor recommends a medically necessary accommodation and the
mother does not receive or seek one. If there were no medical risks then presumably
the medical doctor would not have recommended it in the first instance, even if the
recommendation were just a precaution. For a more in-depth look at the health risks
to pregnant women who do not receive accommodation see, for example, Deborah
A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1
(1995). See also Bakst, supra note 188 (“This kind of law is a public health necessity.
Without its protections, pregnant women are reluctant to ask for the accommoda-
tions they need for their own health and for the health of their unborn children. For
many women, a choice between working under unhealthy conditions and not work-
ing is no choice at all. In addition, women who can work longer into their
pregnancies often qualify for longer periods of leave following childbirth, which fa-
cilitates breastfeeding, bonding with and caring for a new child and a smoother and
healthier recovery from childbirth.”).
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recent passage of state laws and the general desire for friendlier family work-
place policies.194
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION LAWS
The rapidly developing state accommodation laws for pregnant work-
ers will change the landscape of employment law. In addition to the protec-
tion itself, the state laws will positively expand protection for pregnant
workers even in states without accommodation laws, despite the fact there is
no equivalent federal protection. This will be accomplished in two major
ways. First, the state laws might force national employers to change their
policies as a whole rather than just state-by-state. Second, the state accom-
modation laws could provide an impetus for enacting federal legislation or
amending the PDA. For both of these scenarios, a critical mass of state
accommodation laws is crucial.
For example, take a multi-national corporation such as Wal-Mart. As
of 2015, Wal-Mart must provide accommodations for pregnant workers in
twelve states and several cities.195 Despite the fact that Wal-Mart is not le-
gally obligated to provide such accommodations in the remaining jurisdic-
tions, it recently announced a change to its employee policy.196 It may be
that it is beneficial to do so for public relations reasons and ease of adminis-
tration. It would be quite difficult for Wal-Mart to argue that providing
water breaks to a pregnant worker in Missouri is an undue burden while
doing precisely that for a pregnant worker in New Jersey. It seems as though
it would be costly and confusing for Wal-Mart to have different procedures
for pregnant employees across different states. But if Wal-Mart were more
generous and comported with New Jersey’s accommodation law, then
women across the country who work for Wal-Mart would be entitled to
pregnancy accommodations.
This also limits the potential liability of national corporations by
proactively providing an employment protection that might not be required
in every jurisdiction. For example, take the case of Heather Wiseman. There
is little doubt she would succeed on her discrimination claim under the
New Jersey statute. But what if her case took place, instead of New Jersey, in
194. See Brigid Schulte, ‘Mad Men’ Era of U.S. Family Policy Coming to an End?, WASH.
POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
she-the-people/wp/2014/02/12/mad-men-era-of-us-family-policy-coming-to-an-
end/ (reporting that the majority of Americans support “family friendly” policies
such as paid leave and increased sick days).
195. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, supra note 130.
196. Bryce Covert, Pregnant Workers at Walmart Fear the Company’s New Policy Won’t Go
Far Enough to Protect Them, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2014, 1:17 PM) http://think-
progress.org/economy/2014/04/08/3424336/walmart-pregnant-disability-policy/.
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Eastern Pennsylvania? Pennsylvania does not have a pregnancy accommoda-
tion law. However, Philadelphia does, and Pennsylvania’s neighbor, New
Jersey, does. Members of the jury in Eastern Pennsylvania may have friends,
families, or acquaintances who benefit from accommodation laws in Phila-
delphia and New Jersey. It is only human nature that their judgments will
be influenced by this knowledge—even if only subtly. Suppose that there is
a close call of whether Wal-Mart fired her because of the water bottle issue
or on account of pregnancy discrimination. If the stated reason, the insub-
ordination, is not believable or seems like pretext, it might manifest in the
jury’s decision. Of course, that is a narrow hypothetical. However, it costs
an employer like Wal-Mart very little to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions like carrying a water bottle, and doing so avoids negative perceptions
about the company and could potentially help it avoid costly lawsuits. The
case of Heather Wiseman has been used as a rallying call for accommoda-
tion laws by proponents of the laws.197 Perhaps the negative attention from
her case is the reason that Wal-Mart changed its policy,198 or perhaps the
change was because of the critical mass of states providing such accommo-
dations. Wal-Mart itself recognized the rise in accommodation laws. In its
updated policy, Wal-Mart includes a list of the states that currently require
accommodation laws in a prominent box.199 A more optimistic observer
might accept Wal-Mart’s purported reason for the policy change—to “en-
sure women Wal-Mart associates will not be discriminated against when
197. Schulte, supra note 35.
198. Many media sources used the case of Heather Wiseman to illustrate the problems
and injustices associated with a lack of pregnancy work accommodations. See e.g.,
Robin Abcarian, Lawsuit: Forced on Maternity Leave, Forced to Return Before Baby Is
Due, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/16/local/la-
me-ra-pregnant-worker-sues-pier-1-20140416; Nikki Gloudeman, When It Comes to
Pregnancy Discrimination, Equal Is Not the Same As Fair, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
4, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikki-gloudeman/when-it-
comes-to-pregnancy-discrimation_b_6271606.html; Mark Gruenberg, Unions Back
Law to Protect Pregnant Workers, PEOPLE’S WORLD (May 9, 2012), http://peoples-
world.org/unions-back-law-to-protect-pregnant-workers/; Avital Norman Nathman,
Mommie Dearest: Pregnant Women Shouldn’t Lose Their Jobs, THE FRISKY (Mar. 7,
2013), http://www.thefrisky.com/2013-03-07/mommie-dearest-pregnant-women-
shouldnt-lose-their-jobs/; Annamarya Scaccia, The Face of Pregnancy Discrimination,
RH REALITY CHECK (May 1, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/
2013/05/01/the-face-of-pregnancy-discrimination/.
199. Letter from Adam F. Turk, Att’y-Adviser, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, to Erron W.
Smith, Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at 14 (Mar. 19, 2014)
(available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2014/
cynthiamurray031914-14a8.pdf). Wal-Mart later withdrew the shareholder proposal
from its proxy materials after it adopted a pregnancy accommodation policy prior to
its annual shareholders meeting in 2014. Id.
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they are pregnant.”200 So far, women Wal-Mart associates still appear to be
struggling for accommodations.201 The company was recently sued after a
pregnant worker fainted from exposure to toxic cleaning chemicals she used
while on the job; she asked for a transfer from the hazardous position, but
was ignored.202 Wal-Mart issued a statement saying, “[w]e take our policy
seriously. We’re proud of our new policy. It is best in class and goes well
beyond federal and most state laws.”203 This is a positive development. It is
public acknowledgement of an accommodation policy, which may put pres-
sure on other companies to adopt the same.204 That also comports with the
rapidly changing state accommodation laws.
Of course, multi-national corporations expanding their policies na-
tionwide would still exclude women who do not work for those companies
and women who live in states without accommodation laws. The gap be-
tween a corporation’s protections for its employees and workplace protec-
tions for all pregnant workers is a legitimate gap that still remains for
pregnant workers and will remain until a federal law is passed to provide
pregnancy accommodation. However, there may soon be a seismic shift
partly because of the Supreme Court’s recently decided case, Young v. UPS.
The political climate is ripe for providing pregnant workers with ac-
commodations. In addition to the rise in state protections, Young could in-
crease awareness to the issue and influence employers to change their
policies. Some media sources have begun advising employers to err on the
side of caution and consider providing accommodations to pregnant work-
ers post-Young.205 While Young does not go as far as to require an accommo-
200. Id.
201. Brigid Schulte, Wal-Mart faces New Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/12/17/wal-
mart-faces-new-pregnancy-discrimination-charges/.
202. Id.
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204. Lydia DePillis, Under Pressure, Wal-Mart Upgrades its Policy for Helping Pregnant
Workers, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonk
blog/wp/2014/04/05/under-pressure-walmart-upgrades-its-policy-for-helping-preg
nant-workers/ (“And anytime the world’s biggest retailer [Wal-Mart] changes how it
treats its workforce—especially women, with whom the company has a fraught his-
tory—the rest of the industry tends to take notice.”).
205. Suhaill Morales, Supreme Court Ruling Unclear Whether Employers Must Provide Light
Duty to Pregnant Employees, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW (April 14, 2015) http://
www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202723436393/Supreme-Court-Ruling-Unclear-
Whether-Employers-Must-Provide-Light-Duty-to-Pregnant-Employ-
ees?slreturn=20150322201840 (“In order to avoid significant risks for PDA viola-
tions, it would be wise for employers to consider what potential accommodations
might be made for pregnant employees.”); Liz Morris, Cynthia Thomas Calvert &
Joan C. Williams, What Young vs. UPS Means for Pregnant Workers and Their Bosses,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/what-young-vs-ups-
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dation, it does create uncertainty about the standard of comparators and
brings further attention to the plight of pregnant workers.
Putting aside any state or local accommodation law, employers would
be prudent to provide accommodations for pregnant workers. Under the
new Young standard, an employer would have to justify not providing an
accommodation for a pregnant worker when it provides accommodations to
other workers.206 And if the employer cannot justify the lack of accommo-
dation with sufficient evidence, it creates a presumption of discrimination
against the employee.207 Granted, there would have to be an accommoda-
tion provided to other workers for such a presumption. But it would seem
to be exceedingly rare for an employer to never have accommodated any of
its workers, whether it be for a sprained ankle or recovery from a minor
procedure. Moreover, even if the employer can withstand the burden of
justifying its denial of an accommodation, it would probably not want to
litigate the matter in order to do so. The confusion surrounding Young
likely will create a rapid increase in litigation. Presumably, lower courts in-
terpreting Young will have some disagreements among each other and apply
the law slightly differently. If so, there would be tremendous uncertainty for
employers regarding their duty to accommodate pregnant workers. This
should lead employers to the logical step of providing reasonable accommo-
dations for pregnant workers. Accommodations are often low to no cost,
create a positive work environment, avoid potential litigation, protect the
health of workers, and reduce attrition rates. Employers are already obli-
gated to provide accommodations to their disabled workers under the ADA,
so implementing standards would be minimally difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of state pregnancy accommodation laws will have positive
benefits for women in the workplace. Pregnant workers currently face obsta-
cles that have not been addressed through legislation. The PDA is insuffi-
cient to protect them from being fired, the ADA excludes them from
receiving a disability, and the FMLA provides only limited unpaid leave.
means-for-pregnant-workers-and-their-bosses (“Most businesses already provide ac-
commodations to pregnant women because they understand that it is in their best
interest, and the best interest of their employees, to do so. The time has come for
those who have not already complied to get on board. Liability under Title VII
comes with not only compensatory and punitive damages, but often also hefty legal
fees, which may far exceed actual monetary damages awarded. On the other hand,
accommodations required by pregnant women are temporary and typically inexpen-
sive. The smartest and safest course of action is to provide them.”).
206. See supra Part I.
207. Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354–55.
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Simple and reasonable accommodations, such as water breaks and adjusted
work schedules, will allow women to continue working without risking
their health or that of their unborn children. Accommodation laws are par-
ticularly vital for women of lesser socio-economic status, who are often liv-
ing paycheck-to-paycheck and do not have the means or ability to take
pregnancy leave. While the accommodations may seem like a small step, to
some women their provision solves the tension between losing their jobs
and income and being able to continue working.
As more states begin to pass pregnancy accommodation laws, employ-
ers will begin to take notice. Companies will begin to expand accommoda-
tion policies and provide greater flexibility, even in jurisdictions that do not
currently have an accommodation law—just as Wal-Mart did recently. Be-
cause courts will likely begin interpreting the accommodation laws like the
ADA, companies should begin modeling their policies and procedures ac-
cordingly. Perhaps a federal bill will be passed in response to the rapid
growth of increasing state protections. But even if it is not, more states will
continue to pass similar laws. State accommodation laws will provide in-
creased protection to women in the workforce, and increased participation
in the workforce—just as the PDA did over thirty-five years ago. 
